Analytical note on propaganda in Ukraine (focus: occupied territories)

Executive summary (TL;DR)

What Moscow is trying to accomplish (strategic goals)

1. Legitimisation: create a believable story that occupation is beneficial, inevitable, and supported by locals.
2. Pacification: reduce resistance by sowing fatalism, blaming Kyiv for hardships, and promoting narratives of “peace” under Russia.
3. Selective co-optation: recruit collaborators and coerce local administrators to adopt Russian systems (ID, currency, pensions).
4. Information denial: deny Ukrainians and the world access to accurate local news by blocking Ukrainian media and flooding local channels. citeturn0search12turn0search9

Core tactics and tools (what they actually do)

• Telecom control & platform substitution: switching residents to Russian carriers, enforcing data localisation, and pushing state-approved channels while blocking Ukrainian ones.
• Automated amplification on Telegram: a concentrated bot network — thousands of inauthentic accounts posting hundreds of thousands of messages tailored to occupied-area channels — creates a false consensus and drowns independent voices. Researchers mapped ~3,600 accounts active Jan 2024–Apr 2025. citeturn0search3turn0search6
• Narrative pivoting around basic needs: messaging blames Kyiv for shortages (water, electricity, pensions) while highlighting Russian aid/solutions; this exploits real suffering to argue occupation is preferable. Recent reporting documents Kremlin narratives blaming Ukraine for the water shortages in Donetsk and Mariupol. citeturn0news31turn0search9
• “Local” media façade & pseudo-fact-checking sites: launching local news outlets, social accounts, and even fake fact-checkers that recycle Kremlin lines and discredit Ukrainian claims. citeturn0search13
• AI & automation: use of generative models to scale comment production and mimic local speech patterns, increasing volume and speed of disinformation. citeturn0search3

Who is most affected and why it works locally

• Isolated populations with disrupted Ukrainian services and limited internet access are most vulnerable.
• Older demographics and people dependent on pensions/wages are more susceptible when messaging promises stability.
• Information vacuums created by destroyed infrastructure and blocked Ukrainian outlets amplify the impact of any persistent pro-Russian stream. These dynamics are the core reason the digital campaign focuses heavily on occupied-territory Telegram channels. citeturn0search12turn0news31

Measurable effects (what evidence shows so far)

• High volumes of pro-Russian content in occupied channels: hundreds of thousands of bot posts from the mapped network in a recent 16-month period. citeturn0search3
• Tangible local belief shifts in targeted narratives (aid, blame for outages), as documented in field reporting and OSINT monitoring. citeturn0search9turn0news31

Weaknesses, friction points, and resilience

• Local grievances are real — propaganda can exploit them but cannot fully paper over structural collapse (e.g., persistent water shortages undermine messaging). citeturn0news31
• Social networks and informal information channels (word of mouth, local resistive media, partisan messaging) still circulate counter-narratives.
• Technical traceability: coordinated bot networks can be detected and publicized; transparency about those networks reduces their persuasive value. citeturn0search0

Policy & operational recommendations (what works to blunt the campaign)

1. Restore information channels: prioritise restoration of Ukrainian-language broadcasting and resilient satellite/mesh solutions into occupied areas.
2. Expose the mechanics: publish reproducible OSINT reports on bot networks, ownership of “local” outlets, and telecom switches — make the manipulation visible and traceable. (OSINT mapping already proved effective.) citeturn0search3
3. Targeted counter-messaging: use hyperlocal, needs-based messaging (water repairs, humanitarian access, how to access pensions) rather than generic pro-Kyiv slogans.
4. Platform pressure & rapid response: push Telegram and other platforms for clearer takedown/label policies for inauthentic networks while safeguarding legitimate speech; fund rapid-response fact-checkers. citeturn0search6turn0search1
5. Support local civil society: small, secure channels for local organisers and clandestine journalism materially undercut occupation narratives.
6. Sanctions & tech controls: disrupt infrastructure and logistics that enable large-scale bot operations and monetise inauthentic networks where possible.

Two-point watchlist (monthly)

• Bot network activity spikes in occupied-area Telegram channels (volume, account creation patterns). citeturn0search3
• State messaging tied to service manipulations (e.g., narratives blaming Kyiv for water/electric outages coinciding with on-ground crises). citeturn0news31

Conclusion

Russia’s propaganda in occupied Ukraine is a purposeful hybrid tactic: digital amplification + administrative coercion + exploitation of genuine hardship. It is effective where information vacuums and service collapses exist — and most vulnerable to exposure, resilient local networks, and the restoration of independent information flows. Rapid, targeted OSINT, platform engagement, humanitarian fixes (water, power), and localised counter-messaging together form the best short-term defence.