Hero image: Shun Li / Pexels
PSYOPs Exposed: Top Operations July 20–26
This week’s PSYOPs cycle reveals coordinated narratives around fuel prices, AI imagery in conflict zones, and staged civilian testimonies—each designed to shape public perception under the guise of news. A synthesis of independent reporting highlights recurring tactics that blur the line between information and psychological manipulation.
From July 20 to 26, 2026, a series of social media posts, viral videos, and manipulated images circulated across multiple platforms, each framed as breaking news but later revealed as orchestrated influence operations. These operations—dubbed “PSYOPs” for psychological operations—are not new in warfare or geopolitical conflict, but their modern execution leverages algorithmic amplification, AI-generated content, and coordinated inauthentic behavior to manufacture consent or panic. This investigation synthesizes reporting from independent outlets to assess the credibility of these claims, identify patterns of deception, and provide readers with tools to recognize and resist such manipulation. While only one outlet provided direct coverage of the week’s PSYOPs, its detailed account is cross-referenced with broader media literacy principles and institutional responses to build a comprehensive picture of how these operations function in practice.
Introduction to PSYOPs and Context
Psychological operations (PSYOPs) are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to target audiences to influence their emotions, attitudes, and behavior. In the digital age, these operations no longer require physical leaflets or radio broadcasts; instead, they exploit social media algorithms, deepfake technology, and bot networks to spread narratives at scale. The goal is rarely to deceive everyone, but to create enough noise and confusion that critical facts are drowned out, public trust erodes, and narratives favorable to one side gain traction.
This week’s operations—reported in detail by the Gromada Group—centered on three distinct but thematically linked claims: a viral claim that gasoline prices had reached “100” (a unit unspecified but widely interpreted as 100 units of local currency per liter), the appearance of AI-generated images purporting to show a destroyed residential entrance in Saltivka, Kharkiv, and a coordinated campaign featuring supposed “relatives” of Russian soldiers in Surgut alongside a fabricated video of General Drapatyi near a wall in Kharkiv. Each of these claims was amplified through networks of accounts that exhibited hallmarks of inauthentic coordination, including synchronized timing, identical phrasing, and rapid cross-platform reposting.
While PSYOPs are often associated with state actors, the modern ecosystem allows non-state groups, hacktivists, and even individuals to deploy similar tactics. The line between propaganda and performance art has blurred, with some operations designed not to deceive but to provoke outrage, sow division, or test public resilience to disinformation. Understanding these operations requires not only fact-checking individual claims but also recognizing the broader patterns of behavior that signal coordinated manipulation.
Comparing Outlet Reports: Gromada Group and Beyond
Independent reporting on PSYOPs operations remains sparse, as many outlets either avoid the topic due to its technical complexity or rely on official denials without scrutiny. In this context, the Gromada Group’s weekly bulletin stands out for its granular detail and focus on operational mechanics rather than just outcomes. Unlike mainstream outlets that often frame PSYOPs as isolated incidents—e.g., a single viral video or misleading headline—the Gromada report treats these events as components of a larger system, connecting gasoline price claims to AI imagery and staged testimonies through shared infrastructure and narrative threads.
While no other independent outlet published a comparable synthesis for the same week, broader coverage from outlets such as Bellingcat and The Insider in earlier months has documented similar PSYOPs campaigns involving AI-generated images in conflict zones and coordinated disinformation around military movements. These reports emphasize the use of synthetic media to create emotional impact and the exploitation of local grief (e.g., grieving “relatives”) to lend authenticity to false narratives. The Gromada Group’s account aligns with these patterns, particularly in its description of AI imagery being deployed in Saltivka—a district frequently featured in Ukrainian and Russian information warfare due to its symbolic value as a frontline urban area.
Where Gromada diverges from broader media narratives is in its focus on operational timing and infrastructure. While Bellingcat and The Insider often highlight the content of disinformation, Gromada traces the dissemination pathways, noting how posts were scheduled in advance, reposted by clusters of accounts with no prior activity, and amplified by automated amplification networks. This operational lens is critical because it shifts the analysis from “Is this claim true?” to “Who benefits from this claim being believed, and how are they making it spread?”
The Claim: Gasoline “at 100”; AI in a Saltivka Entranceway; Surgut “Relatives” and General Drapatyi’s Kharkiv Wall
Gasoline Prices and the “100” Narrative
According to the Gromada Group, the claim that “gasoline is at 100” emerged on July 21, 2026, via a Telegram channel with fewer than 500 subscribers. Within hours, the post was reposted by dozens of channels, many of which had been dormant for months, and then amplified by automated bots across Twitter (now X), VKontakte, and Odnoklassniki. The post did not specify a currency, unit, or location, leaving the interpretation open to local context—most readers assumed it referred to 100 Ukrainian hryvnias per liter, a dramatic spike from the then-market price of around 45 UAH/liter.
The Gromada report notes that the claim lacked sourcing, price charts, or verification from reputable energy monitors. No major fuel retailer issued a statement, and Ukraine’s Ministry of Energy did not acknowledge the claim in its daily bulletins. Despite the absence of corroboration, the hashtag #бензин100 (gasoline100) trended in Ukraine for 36 hours, driven by accounts that had previously amplified pro-Russian narratives during the 2022–2024 invasion period. This pattern—vague claims amplified by dormant or newly created accounts—is consistent with PSYOPs designed to create economic panic or erode trust in local governance.
AI in a Saltivka Entranceway
The Gromada Group describes a video that circulated on July 22, 2026, purporting to show the entrance of a residential building in Saltivka, Kharkiv, destroyed by shelling. The video included audio of a woman crying and a child’s voice in the background. Upon forensic analysis, the visuals were identified as AI-generated, matching the style of MidJourney v6 with Ukrainian-language prompts. The audio was a composite: the woman’s voice was cloned from a Ukrainian TikTok influencer, while the child’s voice was synthesized using ElevenLabs.
The Gromada report emphasizes that the AI-generated imagery was not a deepfake of a real person, but a fully synthetic scene—a tactic increasingly used to elicit emotional responses without the risk of being debunked by identifiable individuals. The video was shared by accounts that had previously posted about “war crimes” attributed to Ukrainian forces, suggesting a coordinated narrative shift rather than spontaneous outrage. While no other outlet independently verified the AI origin of the video, similar cases have been documented by Bellingcat in March 2026, where AI-generated images of destroyed buildings in Avdiivka were traced to Russian-language Telegram channels with bot amplification.
Surgut “Relatives” and General Drapatyi’s Kharkiv Wall
On July 24, 2026, a series of posts appeared on VKontakte and Telegram featuring videos of individuals claiming to be relatives of Russian soldiers from Surgut, a city in Russia’s Tyumen Oblast. The videos alleged that the soldiers had been abandoned by their command and were being held in poor conditions near Kharkiv. The posts included identical scripts, similar lighting, and backgrounds that matched a single apartment in Surgut. Metadata from the videos showed they were recorded within a 30-minute window, suggesting a coordinated filming session.
Simultaneously, a video surfaced purporting to show Ukrainian General Drapatyi inspecting a wall in Kharkiv with the words “Kharkiv will be free” spray-painted on it. The video’s audio track included a voiceover in Russian claiming that Ukrainian forces were preparing a false-flag attack. The Gromada Group notes that General Drapatyi had not been in Kharkiv for over two weeks, according to his public schedule, and that the wall in question did not match any known location in the city. The video was later traced to a Telegram channel linked to a Russian nationalist militia that had previously spread disinformation about Ukrainian “Nazi” battalions.
While no other outlet published a detailed debunk of these specific claims during the same week, The Insider reported in June 2026 on a similar campaign involving “relatives” of Wagner Group fighters, where videos were filmed in batches and distributed through a centralized network of channels. The recurrence of this tactic—using staged testimonies from supposed family members to humanize a narrative—suggests a deliberate strategy to bypass traditional media gatekeepers by appealing directly to emotional identification.
Combined Evidence: What the Sources Reveal
When the claims from the Gromada Group report are viewed together, a coherent pattern emerges: each operation leverages a different medium—text, image, video, and audio—but shares key operational signatures. The gasoline price claim relied on ambiguity and repetition; the Saltivka AI video used synthetic media to bypass verification; the Surgut “relatives” campaign exploited emotional testimony; and the Drapatyi video combined misattribution with a false-flag narrative. These are not isolated incidents but components of a modular PSYOPs toolkit that can be recombined for different contexts.
The Gromada report provides the only detailed operational breakdown for this week, but its findings align with broader trends documented by other outlets. For instance, Bellingcat has repeatedly shown how AI-generated images are used to create the illusion of widespread destruction in contested cities, while The Insider has traced the infrastructure behind “relatives” campaigns to Russian nationalist networks with ties to military intelligence. The convergence of these tactics—synthetic media, coordinated amplification, and staged testimonies—points to a deliberate strategy of narrative layering, where multiple falsehoods reinforce a single overarching claim (e.g., “Ukraine is collapsing economically” or “Ukrainian forces are committing war crimes”).
Importantly, none of the claims in the Gromada report were substantiated by primary sources or official data. The gasoline price spike lacked retailer confirmation; the Saltivka video was AI-generated; the Surgut relatives’ videos were staged; and the Drapatyi video misrepresented both location and intent. Yet, each claim achieved measurable reach due to algorithmic amplification and coordinated reposting. This discrepancy between evidence and amplification underscores a critical feature of modern PSYOPs: the goal is not to persuade experts, but to saturate the information environment so thoroughly that doubt becomes the default position.
Original Analysis: Patterns Across Sources
Taken together, the operations documented by the Gromada Group and contextualized by prior reporting from Bellingcat and The Insider suggest a shift in PSYOPs from large-scale state campaigns to modular, low-cost operations that can be deployed by smaller groups or even individuals with minimal resources. The gasoline price claim required only a Telegram channel and a bot network; the AI video needed a MidJourney subscription and ElevenLabs credits; the “relatives” campaign required a rented apartment and a script; and the Drapatyi video needed a green screen and audio editing software. The total cost of these operations is likely under $500, yet their potential impact—economic panic, emotional distress, erosion of trust—is disproportionately high.
Another emerging pattern is the use of “emotional proxies” to bypass fact-checking. In each case, the PSYOPs relied not on dry statistics (e.g., “inflation is 20%”) but on visceral triggers: a crying mother (Surgut relatives), a destroyed home (Saltivka AI video), a spike in fuel prices (gasoline “100”), or a military figure near a symbolic wall (Drapatyi). These triggers are designed to short-circuit rational analysis by appealing directly to limbic responses. Social media algorithms, which prioritize engagement over accuracy, amplify such content automatically, creating a feedback loop where emotional posts outperform factual corrections.
Finally, the timing of these operations is not random. The gasoline claim emerged during a period of economic uncertainty in Ukraine, the Saltivka video coincided with a lull in frontline fighting (making real-time verification harder), the Surgut campaign followed a Russian military announcement about mobilizing reservists, and the Drapatyi video was released ahead of a Ukrainian counteroffensive announcement. This synchronization suggests that PSYOPs are increasingly integrated into broader military and political calendars, functioning as force multipliers for kinetic operations.
Red Flags and Debunking Checklist: Identifying PSYOPs
Recognizing PSYOPs requires looking beyond the content of a claim to the behavior of the accounts spreading it. The following checklist is derived from the Gromada Group report and corroborated by patterns documented by Bellingcat and The Insider:
- Synchronized timing: Multiple posts appear within minutes of each other, often with identical phrasing or hashtags, despite originating from unrelated accounts.
- Dormant or new accounts: Accounts that suddenly become active after months of inactivity, or newly created accounts with no prior posting history, are common vectors for PSYOPs.
- Lack of primary sourcing: Claims are not backed by official statements, data dashboards, or verifiable documents. If a claim cites “sources say,” demand to see the sources.
- Emotional triggers: PSYOPs often rely on images or videos designed to elicit fear, anger, or pity—e.g., crying children, destroyed homes, or wounded soldiers—rather than presenting neutral information.
- Cross-platform amplification: A claim appears simultaneously on Telegram, VKontakte, X (Twitter), and Facebook, often via automated reposting tools or bot networks.
- Inconsistent metadata: Videos may have mismatched timestamps, audio that doesn’t sync with visuals, or geolocation tags that don’t match the claimed location.
- Scripted language: Testimonies or captions use identical phrases, unnatural pauses, or overly dramatic language that sounds rehearsed.
- Absence of expert debunks: Major fact-checking organizations (e.g., StopFake, VoxCheck) do not address the claim within 24–48 hours, despite its viral spread.
- Synthetic media signatures: Images show AI artifacts (e.g., distorted hands, unnatural lighting), or videos include audio that matches known AI voice clones.
- Narrative layering: Multiple unrelated claims (e.g., economic collapse + war crimes + military failure) are pushed simultaneously, suggesting a coordinated campaign rather than organic discourse.
If three or more of these red flags are present, the content is highly likely to be part of a PSYOP. The next step is not to share it further, but to document the accounts and networks involved and report them to platform moderators and fact-checking organizations.
Expert Response: Institutional Reactions to PSYOPs
Institutional responses to PSYOPs remain fragmented, reflecting the novelty of the threat and the difficulty of attributing operations to specific actors. Ukraine’s State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection (SSSCIP) has issued periodic warnings about AI-generated content and coordinated inauthentic behavior, but its capacity to monitor and counter PSYOPs in real time is limited by resource constraints. In a July 2026 statement, SSSCIP acknowledged that “synthetic media is increasingly used to create false impressions of events, particularly in frontline cities,” but noted that “the volume of content exceeds our ability to verify each claim individually.”
Civil society organizations have taken a more proactive role. StopFake, a Ukrainian fact-checking NGO, has expanded its AI detection team and now publishes weekly bulletins on synthetic media trends. In an interview with Deutsche Welle in June 2026, StopFake’s editor-in-chief emphasized that “PSYOPs are not just about lies—they’re about creating a fog of war in the information space. Our response must be to shine a light on the infrastructure, not just the content.”
International bodies have been slower to act. The European Union’s East StratCom Task Force, which previously focused on countering Russian disinformation, has not issued a public assessment of PSYOPs since early 2025. A spokesperson for the European External Action Service told Politico Europe in July 2026 that “while we recognize the threat, PSYOPs fall into a gray zone between disinformation and cyber operations, complicating attribution and response.” This ambiguity allows state and non-state actors to operate with plausible deniability.
Meanwhile, platform companies have implemented reactive measures. Meta (Facebook, Instagram) now labels AI-generated content with “Made with AI” disclaimers, and TikTok has restricted the use of its AI image generator in conflict zones. However, these measures are easily circumvented by users who crop, reformat, or repost content without metadata. The Gromada Group report highlights that even labeled AI content can achieve viral spread if it taps into emotional triggers, suggesting that platform policies alone are insufficient to counter PSYOPs.
What to Do About PSYOPs: Protection and Awareness
Individuals and organizations can take concrete steps to reduce their vulnerability to PSYOPs. The first line of defense is cognitive: recognizing that emotional triggers are often the goal, not the byproduct, of disinformation. Before sharing a post about a dramatic event—whether a fuel price spike, a destroyed building, or a soldier’s testimony—pause to ask: Who benefits from me believing this? Is there a primary source? Have major outlets or fact-checkers addressed this?
Technical tools can also help. Reverse image search engines (e.g., Google Lens, Yandex Images) can identify AI-generated or recycled images. Metadata viewers (e.g., Exif Tool) can reveal inconsistencies in timestamps or geolocation. Browser extensions like InVID or Reverse Image Search allow users to check videos frame-by-frame. These tools are not foolproof, but they raise the cost of spreading PSYOPs by making manipulation harder to conceal.
At the community level, local fact-checking networks and media literacy programs are critical. In Ukraine, volunteer groups like VoxCheck and FakeHunters have trained thousands of citizens to recognize PSYOPs, particularly in frontline regions where real-time verification is difficult. These programs emphasize that PSYOPs thrive in information vacuums, so filling those vacuums with verified, local reporting is one of the most effective countermeasures.
Finally, institutional accountability matters. Governments and platforms must move beyond reactive labeling and toward proactive disruption of PSYOP infrastructure. This includes sharing threat intelligence with civil society, suspending accounts involved in coordinated inauthentic behavior, and investing in detection tools that can identify synthetic media at scale. The Gromada Group’s operational analysis demonstrates that PSYOPs leave traces—synchronized timing, bot-like behavior, and narrative repetition—that can be detected if the right tools and incentives are in place.
FAQ: Frequently Asked Questions About PSYOPs
What exactly is a PSYOP, and how is it different from regular propaganda?
A PSYOP is a planned operation to influence emotions, attitudes, and behavior through selected information. Unlike traditional propaganda, which often relies on overt messaging (e.g., posters, radio broadcasts), modern PSYOPs use digital tools—AI, bots, deepfakes—to create the illusion of organic discourse. The goal is not just to persuade, but to manipulate the information environment itself, making it harder to distinguish truth from fiction.
Can I trust a video or image just because it looks real?
No. AI-generated images and videos can be highly realistic, especially when created by advanced models like MidJourney or Stable Diffusion. Even real footage can be decontextualized or mislabeled. Always check for metadata, primary sourcing, and independent verification before sharing. If a claim feels too dramatic to be true, it probably is.
How can I tell if an account is part of a PSYOP network?
Look for synchronized timing (multiple posts at once), identical phrasing, dormant accounts suddenly becoming active, and rapid cross-platform amplification. Tools like Botometer or CrowdTangle can help assess account behavior, but human judgment is still essential. If an account has no prior history but suddenly starts posting about a major event, treat it with skepticism.
What should I do if I encounter a potential PSYOP?
Do not share it. Document the content (screenshot, save links) and report it to the platform. If it involves a local issue (e.g., a claim about your city), notify local fact-checkers or journalists. If it involves a national security issue, consider reporting it to relevant authorities—but be aware that over-reporting can clog systems. The key is to disrupt the amplification cycle, not to feed it.
Are PSYOPs illegal?
It depends on jurisdiction and intent. In many countries, PSYOPs conducted by state actors fall under military or intelligence operations and are not subject to civilian law. Non-state actors may violate platform policies or civil laws against fraud, defamation, or incitement. However, enforcement is inconsistent, and many PSYOPs operate in legal gray zones. The absence of legal consequences does not mean the operations are harmless—only that accountability mechanisms are lagging behind technological capabilities.
Red Flags vs. Legitimate Signals: A Comparison Table
| Red Flag (PSYOP Indicator) | Legitimate Signal (Credible Reporting) |
|---|---|
| Multiple accounts post identical claims within minutes, using the same hashtags and phrasing. | Multiple independent outlets report the same event with varying phrasing and sourcing. |
| A video shows a crying child in a destroyed building, but no local journalists or NGOs have visited the site. | A video is verified by on-the-ground journalists, local authorities, or NGOs with access to the site. |
| An account with no prior activity suddenly posts about a major event, then goes dormant again. | An account with a long history of local reporting posts about an event in its area of coverage. |
| An image shows AI artifacts (e.g., distorted hands, unnatural shadows) but is labeled as real. | An image includes metadata, EXIF data, or provenance links to the original photographer. |
| A claim about economic collapse or military failure lacks primary data, charts, or official statements. | A claim is backed by government reports, central bank data, or verified market indicators. |
| Testimonies from “relatives” use identical scripts, lighting, and backgrounds. | Testimonies are given independently, with varying details and corroborating evidence. |