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Wisconsin Rep. Uses Deepfakes Against Opponent Rebecca Cooke
Wisconsin Rep. Derrick Van Orden deployed AI-generated videos to mimic his opponent, Rebecca Cooke, in what he called satire. The incident raises questions about the weaponization of deepfakes in local races and the readiness of platforms and voters to detect them before the 2026 elections.
In a race for Wisconsin’s 3rd Congressional District, incumbent Rep. Derrick Van Orden (R) used AI-generated videos to impersonate his Democratic challenger, Rebecca Cooke, in what he framed as a satirical critique. The Wausau Pilot & Review reported on August 25, 2026, that Van Orden’s campaign released two deepfake videos in which an AI-generated version of Cooke appeared to make statements endorsing progressive policies and criticizing her own record. The campaign defended the tactic as parody, but the videos circulated widely on social media, prompting questions about the line between satire and disinformation in local elections. This investigation synthesizes the available reporting, examines the tactics used, and assesses the broader implications for Wisconsin’s 2026 electoral integrity.
Context: The Rise of AI-Generated Political Content in Wisconsin
Wisconsin has become a recurring battleground in national elections, with razor-thin margins and high turnout making it a prime target for digital influence operations. While state-level data on deepfake use in Wisconsin elections remains sparse, national trends indicate a rapid increase in AI-generated political content. According to the Wausau Pilot & Review, the Van Orden campaign’s deepfakes represent one of the first documented uses of synthetic video impersonation in a Wisconsin congressional race, though similar tactics have appeared in state legislative and municipal contests across the country. The proliferation of low-cost AI tools has lowered the barrier to entry for creating convincing deepfakes, enabling candidates and third parties to produce and distribute misleading content at scale without traditional production or distribution costs.
The timing of the Van Orden deepfakes—released weeks before early voting begins—mirrors a pattern observed in other states, where synthetic media is deployed in the final stretch of campaigns to sway undecided voters or energize a candidate’s base. While Wisconsin does not have a specific statute criminalizing the use of deepfakes in political campaigns, the state’s existing laws on defamation, impersonation, and election interference provide potential avenues for legal challenges. However, enforcement remains uneven, and the rapid evolution of AI tools often outpaces regulatory responses.
What the Wausau Pilot & Review Reported About Derrick Van Orden’s Deepfake Use
The Wausau Pilot & Review is the only outlet to have published a detailed report on the Van Orden deepfake incident as of August 25, 2026. According to the article, Van Orden’s campaign released two AI-generated videos in which a synthetic version of Cooke appeared to endorse policies such as defunding the police, banning fossil fuels, and supporting Medicare for All. The videos were distributed via the campaign’s social media channels and shared by allied accounts, reaching thousands of users before being flagged by Cooke’s campaign and fact-checkers.
The Wausau Pilot & Review noted that Van Orden’s team characterized the videos as “satire,” arguing that they were intended to highlight Cooke’s progressive platform. The article quoted Van Orden’s communications director, who stated, “We’re using humor to contrast her stated positions with the reality of her record.” However, the article also pointed out that the videos did not include clear disclaimers indicating they were AI-generated, a practice recommended by digital literacy experts to prevent misinterpretation. The Wausau Pilot & Review did not identify the specific AI tool used to create the deepfakes, nor did it provide an estimate of the videos’ reach or engagement metrics.
How the Deepfakes Were Deployed: A Breakdown of the Tactics
Creation and Distribution
According to the Wausau Pilot & Review, the deepfakes were produced using publicly available AI voice and video synthesis tools, which allow users to generate realistic speech and facial movements from text prompts. The campaign reportedly input Cooke’s past statements and policy positions into the AI system to create the synthetic video segments. The resulting videos were then edited to include captions and hashtags, such as #CookeConcedes and #WisconsinValues, to amplify their reach among conservative audiences.
The Wausau Pilot & Review did not specify whether the videos were boosted through paid advertising or relied solely on organic sharing. However, the article noted that the campaign’s social media accounts amplified the content, and allied accounts—including local and national conservative influencers—further distributed the videos. The lack of disclosure about the AI origin of the content raises concerns about transparency, as viewers may assume the videos are authentic recordings of Cooke’s statements.
Timing and Targeting
The Wausau Pilot & Review reported that the deepfakes were released during a period of heightened attention to the race, as both campaigns were finalizing their messaging for the final weeks of the campaign. The timing suggests a strategic decision to influence voter perceptions before early voting begins, a common tactic in close races. While the article did not provide demographic data on the videos’ audience, the use of conservative-aligned hashtags and accounts indicates an attempt to mobilize the Republican base rather than persuade undecided voters.
Lack of Attribution and Disclosure
The Wausau Pilot & Review highlighted a key red flag: the absence of clear labeling indicating the videos were AI-generated. The campaign did not include on-screen text or audio disclaimers, nor did it disclose the use of synthetic media in the videos’ captions or posts. This omission is significant, as the Federal Election Commission (FEC) and state election authorities have not yet established clear guidelines for labeling AI-generated political content. The lack of disclosure increases the risk of misinformation, as viewers may mistake the synthetic content for authentic footage.
Where the Reporting Agrees and What It Omits
As the only outlet to report on the Van Orden deepfake incident, the Wausau Pilot & Review’s account serves as the sole primary source for this investigation. The article provides a detailed description of the videos’ content, the campaign’s defense of the tactic, and the absence of disclosure. However, the report lacks several critical details that would be necessary for a full assessment of the incident’s impact and implications.
Notably, the Wausau Pilot & Review did not provide:
- Estimates of the videos’ reach or engagement, such as views, shares, or impressions;
- Information about the AI tools used to create the deepfakes, including whether they were commercially available or custom-built;
- Statements from Cooke’s campaign about the impact of the deepfakes on her campaign or voter perceptions;
- Reactions from social media platforms regarding the videos’ compliance with their policies on synthetic media;
- Analysis from digital forensics experts on the authenticity of the deepfakes or the techniques used to detect them.
These omissions limit the ability to fully evaluate the incident’s scope and the effectiveness of existing safeguards. The lack of corroborating reports from other outlets also means that the Wausau Pilot & Review’s account cannot be independently verified at this time.
The Claim: Was This a Satirical Prank or a Coordinated Disinformation Tactic?
The central dispute in this case revolves around the intent behind the deepfakes. Van Orden’s campaign has framed the videos as satire, a form of political commentary intended to highlight the contrast between Cooke’s stated positions and her record. However, the absence of clear labeling and the videos’ distribution through the campaign’s official channels raise questions about whether the tactic crosses into the realm of disinformation.
Satire typically relies on exaggeration and obvious cues—such as absurdity or irony—to signal that the content is not meant to be taken literally. In this case, the deepfakes mimicked Cooke’s appearance and voice with a high degree of realism, making it difficult for viewers to discern their artificial nature. The Wausau Pilot & Review did not identify any overt cues indicating the videos were satirical, such as exaggerated facial expressions or implausible scenarios. Without such cues, viewers may have interpreted the content as authentic, particularly if they were not familiar with Cooke’s actual positions.
Moreover, the timing and targeting of the deepfakes suggest a strategic intent to influence voter perceptions. By releasing the videos weeks before early voting, the campaign could shape the narrative around Cooke’s platform before voters had the opportunity to fact-check her statements. This timing aligns with tactics used in disinformation campaigns, where synthetic media is deployed to create confusion or undermine an opponent’s credibility.
Taken together, the lack of clear labeling, the realistic presentation of the deepfakes, and the strategic timing suggest that the tactic may have functioned as a form of disinformation disguised as satire. However, without additional evidence—such as internal campaign communications or audience surveys—it is difficult to conclusively determine the campaign’s intent.
Evidence Synthesis: What the Single-Source Report Actually Demonstrates
The Wausau Pilot & Review’s report provides a foundational account of the Van Orden deepfake incident, but it is limited by the absence of corroborating sources or technical analysis. The article confirms that AI-generated videos impersonating Cooke were created and distributed by Van Orden’s campaign, and that the campaign defended the tactic as satire. However, the report does not establish the videos’ reach, the specific AI tools used, or the platforms’ responses to the content.
In the absence of additional reporting, several key questions remain unanswered:
- How many voters were exposed to the deepfakes, and did they influence perceptions of Cooke’s platform?
- Were the deepfakes detected and removed by social media platforms, and if so, under what policies?
- Did the videos trigger any complaints to election authorities or requests for investigations?
- Are there similar incidents in other Wisconsin races that have not been reported?
These gaps highlight the challenges of investigating AI-generated misinformation in local elections, where resources for digital forensics and media literacy are often limited. The single-source nature of the reporting also underscores the need for greater transparency from campaigns, platforms, and election authorities about the use of synthetic media in political advertising.
Who Is Affected: Voters, Candidates, and the Integrity of Wisconsin’s 2026 Elections
The Van Orden deepfake incident has implications for multiple stakeholders in Wisconsin’s electoral ecosystem. For voters, the incident raises concerns about their ability to distinguish between authentic and synthetic content, particularly in races where they may have limited prior knowledge of the candidates. The lack of clear labeling in the deepfakes exacerbates this challenge, as viewers may assume the content is genuine.
For candidates, the incident highlights the vulnerability of their public statements and appearances to manipulation. Even if a candidate does not use deepfakes themselves, they may become the target of synthetic media created by opponents or third parties. This dynamic can distort the electoral process, as voters may form impressions of a candidate based on fabricated content rather than their actual record.
For the integrity of Wisconsin’s elections, the incident underscores the need for proactive measures to detect and mitigate the spread of AI-generated misinformation. The state’s election infrastructure—including county clerks, the Wisconsin Elections Commission, and local media—plays a critical role in ensuring that voters have access to accurate information. However, the rapid evolution of AI tools and the decentralized nature of digital platforms pose significant challenges to these efforts.
How AI-Generated Misinformation Spreads in Local Races
The Van Orden deepfake incident illustrates several mechanisms by which AI-generated misinformation spreads in local races. First, the use of AI tools lowers the cost and complexity of creating convincing synthetic media, enabling campaigns and third parties to produce content quickly and at scale. Second, the distribution of such content through social media—particularly via accounts aligned with a candidate’s political base—amplifies its reach and engagement. Third, the lack of clear labeling and disclosure increases the likelihood that viewers will mistake synthetic content for authentic footage.
In local races, where resources for fact-checking and media literacy are often limited, these dynamics can be particularly damaging. Unlike national elections, local contests typically receive less scrutiny from mainstream media and fact-checking organizations, making it easier for misinformation to go unchallenged. Additionally, local voters may have fewer opportunities to verify the authenticity of content, particularly if they are not active on social media or lack access to digital literacy resources.
The Wausau Pilot & Review’s report suggests that the Van Orden deepfakes were shared primarily through conservative-aligned accounts, indicating an attempt to mobilize the Republican base rather than persuade undecided voters. This targeting strategy aligns with broader trends in digital campaigning, where synthetic media is often used to reinforce existing beliefs among a candidate’s supporters rather than change minds among swing voters.
Red Flags and a Debunking Checklist for Recognizing Deepfakes in Campaigns
Identifying deepfakes in political content requires a combination of technical awareness and critical thinking. Below is a checklist of red flags and legitimate signals to help voters, journalists, and campaign staff distinguish between authentic and synthetic media.
| Red Flags | Legitimate Signals |
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Voters should also be cautious of content that triggers strong emotional reactions, as deepfakes are often designed to provoke outrage or fear. When in doubt, cross-referencing the content with trusted news sources or fact-checking organizations can help verify its authenticity. Campaigns, meanwhile, should adopt transparent practices for labeling AI-generated content and promptly correct any inaccuracies resulting from synthetic media.
Expert and Institutional Responses to AI in Political Advertising
As AI-generated political content becomes more prevalent, a range of experts and institutions have weighed in on the need for safeguards and regulations. Digital forensics researchers emphasize the importance of developing tools to detect deepfakes and authenticate digital media. Organizations such as the Coalition for AI Integrity and the Partnership on AI have called for industry-wide standards for labeling synthetic content and sharing detection tools with journalists and election officials.
At the institutional level, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) has begun exploring potential regulations for AI-generated political advertising. In 2023, the FEC issued an advisory opinion stating that AI-generated content in political ads may be subject to disclosure requirements under existing laws. However, the agency has not yet finalized specific rules, leaving a regulatory gray area that campaigns can exploit. State election authorities, including the Wisconsin Elections Commission, have also begun issuing guidance on AI-generated content, but enforcement remains inconsistent.
Social media platforms have taken varied approaches to addressing deepfakes in political advertising. Meta, which owns Facebook and Instagram, has pledged to label AI-generated content in political ads and remove synthetic media that violates its policies on misinformation or impersonation. TikTok, meanwhile, has banned the use of synthetic media in political ads altogether. However, the effectiveness of these policies depends on the platforms’ ability to detect and label deepfakes accurately, a challenge that grows more difficult as AI tools become more sophisticated.
Original Analysis: The Pattern of Deepfake Use in Midterm and Local Elections
Taken together, the Van Orden deepfake incident and broader trends in AI-generated political content suggest a troubling pattern: the weaponization of synthetic media in local and midterm elections, where oversight is limited and the stakes are high. While much of the public discourse on deepfakes has focused on national elections and high-profile races, the Wisconsin case demonstrates that synthetic media is increasingly being deployed in down-ballot contests, where the margin for error is smaller and the resources for countering misinformation are scarcer.
One notable trend is the blurring of lines between satire and disinformation. Campaigns are increasingly using AI-generated content under the guise of humor, arguing that their tactics are protected as political speech. However, the lack of clear labeling and the realistic presentation of synthetic media make it difficult for voters to discern the intent behind such content. This ambiguity creates a loophole that campaigns can exploit to spread misleading narratives without facing legal or reputational consequences.
Another pattern is the targeting of candidates’ public statements and appearances, rather than their private lives or unrelated controversies. By mimicking a candidate’s voice and likeness, deepfakes can distort their platform and undermine their credibility. This tactic is particularly effective in races where voters have limited prior knowledge of the candidates, as it allows opponents to shape perceptions before voters have the opportunity to fact-check.
The Wisconsin case also highlights the role of social media platforms in amplifying or mitigating the spread of deepfakes. While some platforms have implemented policies to label or remove synthetic media, enforcement is inconsistent, and the algorithms that drive engagement often prioritize content that provokes strong emotional reactions—regardless of its authenticity. This dynamic creates an environment where deepfakes can spread rapidly, particularly if they align with the political leanings of a platform’s user base.
Finally, the lack of transparency from campaigns and platforms underscores the need for greater accountability. Without clear disclosure requirements and robust detection tools, voters are left to navigate a digital landscape filled with synthetic media that can influence their perceptions and voting decisions. The Wisconsin case serves as a warning of what may become a more widespread phenomenon in future elections, unless proactive measures are taken to address the threat.
What to Do: Policy, Platform, and Public Responses to Combat AI Misinformation
Addressing the threat of AI-generated misinformation in elections requires a coordinated response from policymakers, platforms, and the public. Below are key steps that can be taken to mitigate the impact of deepfakes in Wisconsin’s 2026 elections and beyond.
Policy Responses
State and federal policymakers can take several actions to regulate the use of AI in political advertising and enhance transparency. First, they can establish clear labeling requirements for AI-generated content in political ads, ensuring that voters are aware when they are viewing synthetic media. Second, they can expand the authority of election authorities to investigate and penalize the use of deepfakes that violate existing laws on defamation, impersonation, or election interference. Third, they can invest in digital forensics tools and training for election officials, enabling them to detect and respond to synthetic media more effectively.
At the federal level, the FEC could finalize rules requiring campaigns to disclose the use of AI tools in political ads, similar to existing requirements for paid advertising. State legislatures, including Wisconsin’s, could pass laws mandating that synthetic media be clearly labeled and that platforms remove such content if it violates election laws. Additionally, lawmakers could explore the creation of a nonpartisan digital media literacy program to educate voters about the risks of deepfakes and how to identify them.
Platform Responses
Social media platforms have a critical role to play in combating the spread of AI-generated misinformation. They can enhance their detection tools to identify synthetic media more accurately and apply consistent labeling policies across all political content. Platforms should also prioritize transparency by disclosing the use of AI tools in political ads and providing users with resources to verify the authenticity of content.
Moreover, platforms can adjust their algorithms to reduce the virality of content that is likely to be synthetic or misleading, particularly if it aligns with partisan narratives. While this approach may face criticism from free speech advocates, it is a necessary step to prevent the rapid spread of deepfakes that can distort electoral outcomes. Platforms should also collaborate with independent fact-checkers and digital forensics experts to improve their detection capabilities and share best practices.
Public Responses
Voters, journalists, and campaign staff can take several steps to combat the spread of deepfakes. Voters should adopt a skeptical mindset when consuming political content, particularly if it triggers strong emotional reactions or aligns too perfectly with a candidate’s stated positions. They should cross-reference content with trusted news sources and fact-checking organizations, and be wary of content that lacks clear labeling or disclosure.
Journalists can play a critical role by investigating and reporting on the use of synthetic media in elections, as the Wausau Pilot & Review did in this case. They can also collaborate with digital forensics experts to verify the authenticity of political content and provide context for voters. Campaign staff, meanwhile, should adopt transparent practices for labeling AI-generated content and promptly correct any inaccuracies resulting from synthetic media.
Finally, communities can organize digital literacy workshops and town halls to educate voters about the risks of deepfakes and how to identify them. These efforts can empower voters to make informed decisions and reduce the impact of synthetic media on electoral outcomes.
FAQ: Deepfakes in Wisconsin’s 2026 Elections
What are deepfakes, and how are they used in political campaigns?
Deepfakes are AI-generated videos, audio clips, or images that mimic real people with a high degree of realism. In political campaigns, deepfakes are often used to impersonate candidates, distort their platforms, or spread misleading narratives. They can be deployed as satire, disinformation, or a combination of both, depending on the intent of the creator.
Is it legal for a campaign to use deepfakes in Wisconsin?
Wisconsin does not have a specific law criminalizing the use of deepfakes in political campaigns, but existing laws on defamation, impersonation, and election interference may apply. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) has also indicated that AI-generated content in political ads may be subject to disclosure requirements under existing laws. However, enforcement remains inconsistent, and the legal landscape is evolving.
How can voters tell if a political video is a deepfake?
Voters should look for red flags such as unnatural facial movements, inconsistencies between lip movements and spoken words, robotic audio, and lack of clear labeling. They should also cross-reference the content with trusted news sources or fact-checking organizations. If in doubt, assume the content may be synthetic and seek additional verification.
What should social media platforms do to address deepfakes in political ads?
Platforms should enhance their detection tools to identify synthetic media more accurately and apply consistent labeling policies across all political content. They should also prioritize transparency by disclosing the use of AI tools in political ads and providing users with resources to verify the authenticity of content. Additionally, platforms can adjust their algorithms to reduce the virality of content that is likely to be synthetic or misleading.
What steps can Wisconsin election officials take to combat deepfakes?
Wisconsin election officials can invest in digital forensics tools and training for county clerks and election staff, enabling them to detect and respond to synthetic media more effectively. They can also issue guidance for campaigns on the responsible use of AI tools and collaborate with social media platforms to monitor and address the spread of deepfakes. Additionally, they can educate voters about the risks of deepfakes and how to identify them through public awareness campaigns.